History

T h e H ar r i son H i stor y M agazi n e

ED I T ORI AL

D ear Reader ,

.T he even t s of the past year have m ade i t d i f f i cu l t to pub l i sh as m any ed i t i on s of T he H ar r i son H i stor y M agazi ne as I wou l d have l i ked . Bu t as the coun t r y r etu r n s to ?norm al ,? so, too, w i l l th i s pub l i cat i on? and a new er a dem ands new m anagem en t . For two year s now, the studen t ed i tor i al team has con si sted so l el y of m ysel f and Kar do Beck (L ower Si x th ), who, as ever , has done a ter r i f i c job desi gn i ng the cu r r en t ed i t i on of the m agazi ne. And so, as I com e to the end of m y t im e at Tay l or s?, I l eave vacan t the posi t i on of ch i ef ed i tor . Bu t f ear not : the m agazi ne w i l l go on ! For the posi t i on has al r eady been en t r usted to Rawdy Par t r i dge (Fi f ths), one of the m ost p r o l i f i c and im p r essi ve con t r i bu tor s to th i s pub l i cat i on over i t s shor t l i f espan . I ther ef or e l eave the m agazi ne i n an excep t i onal l y saf e pai r of hands. Rawdy w i l l al so benef i t f r om the adv i ce of M r . Fl ower , who con t i nues to over see the oper at i on of the m agazi ne, and who has l en t h i s char acter i st i c en thusi asm to get t i ng the cu r r en t ed i t i on over the l i ne. T h i s, then , m y l ast ed i t i on as ed i tor , m ay not be the l ength i est? m any of ou r usual con t r i bu tor s have been busy si t t i ng exam s? bu t i t m ar ks the end of an er a and the begi nn i ng of a new one. And though I w i l l not have a r o l e i n wr i t i ng th i s, the nex t chap ter i n the h i stor y of th i s par t i cu l ar h i stor y m agazi ne, I hope to be one of i t s keenest r eader s. Joe Morgan (Editor) and Kardo Beck (Deputy Editor)

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Con ten t s

Ch ar l es I : H er o or V i l l ai n ?, Page 4 Max Crossic, Upper T hirds

T h e Con ser vat i sm of th e N ew D eal , Page 26 Alex T illotson, Lower Sixth

T h e L ast Con f essi on al W ar , Page 8 Luca Spaccatrosi, Divisions

T h e Sh i va N atar aj a, Page 30 Neel Gokal, Lower Sixth

T h e Econ om i cs of Fasci sm , Page 14 Rawdy Partridge, Fifths

Ch al k e Val l ey, Page 34 Joe Morgan, Upper Sixth

Ver sai l l es an d th e I m p act on Ger m an y, Page 19 Edward Richardson, Fifths

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Ch ar l es I : H er o or V i l l ai n ? Max Crossic, Upper T hirds

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he Engl i sh Ci v i l War of 1642 to 1651 was the p r oduct of a l ong l i ne of bad deci si on -m ak i ng

cou r se, anger ed the coun t r y, wh i ch at the t im e was ver y Pr otestan t . To f u r ther anger the peop l e, Char l es l et H en r i et ta p r i vatel y p r act i ce Catho l i ci sm . I t cou l d ther ef or e be sai d that h i s r ei gn got of f to a bad star t , and u l t im atel y, th i s m ar i tal deci si on wou l d be one of m any to l ead to the Engl i sh Ci v i l War , al ongsi de bei ng the t r i gger f or other poor deci si on s f u r ther down the l i ne (wh i ch I w i l l exp l or e l ater ). Second l y, Char l es deci ded i n 1628 to r u l e w i thou t Par l i am en t . D u r i ng th i s t im e, Char l es?s r el i gi ous and econom i c po l i ci es wer e unpopu l ar , w i th som e h i stor i an s cl aim i ng that th i s br ough t the Ci v i l War cl oser . W i thou t Par l i am en t f or f und i ng, Char l es had to som ehow get m oney, and thus i n f am ousl y i n t r oduced r ef orm s to the Sh i p Tax . T hese r ef orm s to the tax m ean t that , r ather than r esi den t s near the coast on l y hav i ng to pay the tax du r i ng t im es of naval need , the who l e coun t r y had to pay the tax year - r ound , whether the navy was i n need of f und i ng

and aw f u l cho i ces m ade by K i ng Char l es I . I n th i s essay, I w i l l be exp l ai n i ng the r eason s why I th i n k that Char l es I was r espon si b l e f or the Engl i sh Ci v i l War . I bel i eve that the Ci v i l War was the p r oduct not of one even t , bu t r ather of m any. I bel i eve that the K i ng was r espon si b l e f or the Ci v i l War because he m ar r i ed a Fr en ch Catho l i c, he co l l ected m oney w i thou t the perm i ssi on of Par l i am en t , he deci ded to tem por ar i l y r un the coun t r y w i thou t Par l i am en t , he ?Catho l i ci sed? the Chu r ch of Engl and , and he r ef used the N i neteen Pr oposi t i on s when he f i nal l y r eopened Par l i am en t (f or a r ecor d t im e of on l y th r ee weeks). M y f i r st po i n t i s to do w i th Char l es?s per sonal deci si on r egar d i ng h i s m ar r i age ear l y on i n h i s r ei gn . I n 1625, Char l es deci ded to m ar r y a Fr en ch Catho l i c, H en r i et ta M ar i a (who thus becam e the Q ueen Con sor t ). T h i s, of

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or not . We can tel l , as wel l , that th i s tax was unpopu l ar because so f ew peop l e actual l y pai d i t . £250 ,0 0 0 was expected f r om th i s tax , yet on l y 20% of th i s am oun t was co l l ected (£50 ,0 0 0 ). M y th i r d po i n t i s on Char l es deci d i ng to ?Catho l i ci se? the Chu r ch of Engl and w i th Ar chb i shop L aud? th i s m ade m any peop l e unhappy. T h i s deci si on had connect i on s to Char l es deci d i ng to m ar r y Fr en ch Catho l i c H en r i et ta M ar i a ear l i er on i n h i s r ei gn . T he unpopu l ar duo deci ded to m ake chu r ches m or e beau t i f u l , cl aim i ng that i t wou l d m ake peop l e f eel a cl oser af f i l i at i on and connect i on to God when p r ay i ng. Fu r therm or e, L aud and Char l es d i sl i ked the i dea of serm on s bei ng p r eached . Peop l e wer e anger ed because they f el t that these r ef orm s wer e ver y m uch i n l i ne w i th Catho l i ci sm , and peop l e gr eat l y d i sl i ked the i dea of the Catho l i c Chu r ch r etu r n i ng to Engl and . Fu r therm or e, peop l e wer e unhappy because Char l es?s w i f e had her own per sonal chapel and p r i est .

Fo l l ow i ng th i s, Char l es deci ded to i n t r oduce the new Engl i sh Book of Com m on Pr ayer to Scot l and , w i thou t even ask i ng f or perm i ssi on f r om the Scot s, or even ask i ng thei r op i n i on . T h i s r esu l ted i n ou t r age, and a Scot t i sh r ebel l i on . T he Scot s d i sl i ked Catho l i ci sm and bel i eved that th i s new p r ayer book was f ar too al i gned w i th the i deas of Catho l i ci sm . O f cou r se, when i t was i n h i s i n ter est s, Char l es deci ded to m ake the Engl i sh pay a tax to f und the so l d i er s? un i f orm and al so to r ecal l Par l i am en t , al though agai n , when Par l i am en t r ejected the r ef orm s, M Ps wer e sen t hom e on ce m or e (w i th i n on l y th r ee weeks). W hen he needed m oney agai n , Char l es r ecal l ed Par l i am en t l ater i n the year , i n Novem ber 1640 . T h i s, of cou r se, anger ed the peop l e due to Par l i am en t?s i n con si sten t open i ngs, and al so i n cr eased tax , and th i s u l t im atel y was another t r i gger f or the Engl i sh Ci v i l War , and the K i ng was to b l am e. Fi nal l y, when r ecal l ed Par l i am en t dem anded r ef orm s, known as the

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N i neteen Pr oposi t i on s, Char l es i gnor ed them . Al though ar guab l y these r ef orm s wer e r ather dem and i ng, they wer e essen t i al to en su r e the sm ooth r unn i ng of the coun t r y and al so to r educe the chaos. Yet the K i ng r ef used th i s r ef orm and u l t im atel y due to h i s i gnor an ce and due to h im decl i n i ng these r ef orm s, the Ci v i l War began I n con cl usi on , I bel i eve that the K i ng was r espon si b l e f or the Ci v i l War f or a f ew r eason s. T he f i r st r eason why he was r espon si b l e i s because he m ar r i ed a Fr en ch Catho l i c Wom en . T he second r eason why Char l es was to b l am e f or the Ci v i l War i s due to h i s deci si on to r u l e w i thou t Par l i am en t , and then to r ef orm the Sh i p Tax at a t im e wher e h i s econom i c and r el i gi ous po l i ci es wer e as deep l y unpopu l ar as they wer e. T he th i r d r eason why Char l es was to b l am e f or the Ci v i l war was that he deci ded to ?Catho l i ci se? the Chu r ch of Engl and , and l et h i s w i f e p r act i ce Catho l i ci sm i n p r i vate, both

deci si on s bei ng agai n st the w i l l of the peop l e and ther ef or e anger i ng the peop l e. T he f ou r th r eason why Char l es was r espon si b l e i s because he deci ded to i n t r oduce the m uch - d i sl i ked Engl i sh Book of Com m on Pr ayer i n Scot l and , wh i ch r esu l ted i n an ou t r age. Add i t i onal l y, tax i ng the peop l e of Engl and f or so l d i er un i f orm f und i ng, as wel l as i n con si sten t l y r eopen i ng and cl osi ng Par l i am en t to ask f or f und i ng, d i d not im p r ove the K i ng?s popu l ar i t y. T he f i nal r eason why Char l es was r espon si b l e f or the Ci v i l War i s that he i gnor an t l y r ef used the N i neteen Pr oposi t i on s, wh i ch wou l d have been essen t i al i n m ak i ng su r e that the coun t r y d i dn?t en ter i n to f u r ther tu rm o i l , and wh i ch wou l d al so have m ade su r e Par l i am en t that r em ai ned stab l e. T hat i s why I bel i eve that Char l es was r espon si b l e f or the Engl i sh Ci v i l War .

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T he L ast Con f essi onal War . Luca Spaccatrosi , Divisions.

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9 n GCSE H i stor y, you study even t s that excl usi vel y take p l ace between 1918 and

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T he m ai n cause f or the star t of the T h i r t y Year s? War was the co l l apse of the system estab l i shed by the Peace of Augsbu r g i n the ear l y si x teen th cen tu r y. T he t r eat y was si gned i n Sep tem ber 1555 between Em per or Char l es V (r ep r esen t i ng Catho l i c i n ter est s), and the Schm al kal d i c L eague (r ep r esen t i ng L u ther an i n ter est s). I t s gu i d i ng p r i n ci p l e was ?cu i us r egi o, ei us r el i gi o? (?whose r ealm , thei r r el i gi on?). I t estab l i shed a l egal basi s f or p r i n ces to choose between Catho l i ci sm and L u ther an i sm ; however , i t negl ected Cal v i n i sm and other sm al l er con f essi onal nuan ces. T he set t l em en t was al so ex t r em el y vague, a p r oduct of the need to p l ease both par t i es. T he r esu l t of th i s enab l ed two ex t r em es of i n ter p r etat i on to sl ow l y devel op , one l ed by Bavar i a and Aust r i a? the other l ed by the El ector al Pal at i nate. T he con f l i ct cam e to a head i n the Rei chstag of 160 8, i n wh i ch the Pr otestan t ex t r em e w i thd r ew af ter a r equest f or the f orm al r ecogn i t i on of the Augsbu r g

1991, wh i ch m akes i t st r ange f or m e to wr i te abou t even t s that happened alm ost 30 0 year s p r i or . H owever , ther e i s one key i dea that l i n ks 1630 and 1918: that of the bal an ce of power . T he f i r st m ajor con sequen ce of th i s i dea was the Swed i sh en t r y i n to the T h i r t y Year s? War , and i t s dom i nan ce was supposed l y ended by the T r eat y of Ver sai l l es, whose estab l i shm en t of the L eague of Nat i on s p r om oted co l l ect i ve secu r i t y as an al ter nat i ve to war . T he i dea of the bal an ce of power r ep l aced f or ei gn po l i cy d i ctated by con f essi onal d i f f er en ces, i n stead r ep l aci ng i t w i th a m or e nuan ced v i si on that p r i or i t i sed p r agm at i sm above al l el se. To under stand why th i s new, p r agm at i c app r oach was taken , i t i s essen t i al to under stand why the T h i r t y Year s? War star ted , and why i t escal ated f r om a r egi onal con f l i ct i n to a m ajor Eu r opean war .

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set t l em en t was den i ed . I t was the f i r st Rei chstag to end w i thou t the cl osi ng r ecess. I t i s im por tan t to note that the Pal at i nate was, i n f act , Cal v i n i st? ther e wer e no l egal p r ov i si on s r egar d i ng them , wh i ch l ef t them i n the r ather unusual si tuat i on of par tak i ng i n an i l l egal con f essi on w i thou t the con sequen ces of bei ng conv i cted of her esy ; they wer e, af ter al l , a sover ei gn state, thei r au thor i t y super seded on l y by that of the em per or . T he im m ed i ate r esu l t of th i s was the f orm al i sat i on of these two ex t r em es i n to al l i an ces. T he f i r st to com e i n to ex i sten ce was the Pr otestan t Un i on , l ed by the El ector al Pal at i nate. T h i s i n cl uded al l the m ajor Pr otestan t states excep t one: the El ector ate of Saxony, wh i ch st i l l cl ung on to the hope that con f essi onal d i f f er en ces cou l d be r eso l ved th r ough im per i al i n st i tu t i on s i n stead of by f or ce. T he other cam e i n to ex i sten ce the f o l l ow i ng year . T he Catho l i c L eague was f ounded by Bavar i a i n 160 9. By

1613, jo i ned , al ongsi de Spai n . T h i s was the f i r st r eal act i on by a non -Germ an power ; however , si n ce Aust r i a and Spai n both shar ed the sam e r u l i ng dy nast y, th i s d i d not r ep r esen t a si gn i f i can t step towar ds a m or e p r agm at i c app r oach to i n ter nat i onal r el at i on s (the sp l i t on l y occu r r ed af ter the abd i cat i on of Char l es V i n 1556). I n 1618, the con f essi onal ten si on s cam e to a bo i l i ng po i n t , and sp i l t over . W hen Fer d i nand I I ascended to the th r one of Bohem i a i n 1617, Pr otestan t Bohem i an nob l es wer e gr eat l y susp i ci ous of h im , as he had p r ev i ousl y been appo i n ted the Ar chduke of St y r i a, i n wh i ch posi t i on he had successf u l l y er ad i cated Pr otestan t i sm w i th i n ei gh teen m on ths. T hese susp i ci on s cam e abou t desp i te Fer d i nand r econ f i rm i ng Pr otestan t r el i gi ous f r eedom s af ter he had been el ected . T h i s was f u r ther m ade wor se by the con cl usi on of f ou r l egal d i spu tes Aust r i a had

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r el at i ng to con f essi onal f r eedom s, al l of wh i ch wer e con cl uded on the si de of the Catho l i c Chu r ch . I n M ay 1618, a m eet i ng took p l ace between Pr otestan t nob l es l ed by Coun t T hu r n and two r ep r esen tat i ves send by Fer d i nand I I . T he r esu l t of th i s m eet i ng was the Second D ef enest r at i on (def enest r at i on i s the techn i cal term f or th r ow i ng som ebody ou t of a w i ndow) of Pr ague. Rem ar kab l y, Fer d i nand?s two r ep r esen tat i ves su r v i ved the m u l t i - stor y f al l . T hu r n p r oceeded to cr eate a new gover nm en t and begi n an i nvasi on i n to the Aust r i an cor e p r ov i n ces of Si l esi a, Upper Aust r i a, and L ower Aust r i a. By June, he had successf u l l y f ough t h i s way to Vi enna; however , due to p r essu r e f r om l ar gel y Span i sh f or ces, he had to r et r eat and p r otect Bohem i a i t sel f . T he con f l i ct was escal ated f r om a pu r el y r egi onal con f l i ct to a w i der Germ an con f l i ct when Fr eder i ck V of the El ector al Pal at i nate was of f er ed , and accep ted , the cr own of Bohem i a, desp i te al l bu t one of

h i s per sonal adv i sor s u r gi ng h im not to. T he r eason f or the unpopu l ar i t y of th i s deci si on was the connotat i on s that accom pan i ed i t : he had r em oved a con st i tu t i onal l y el ected k i ng. D ue to th i s, he was abandoned by the Pr otestan t L eague? the or gan i sat i on he h im sel f had hel ped set up . T he war was f u r ther escal ated by the Bavar i an i nvasi on and occupat i on of the Upper Pal at i nate, wh i l st the Span i sh occup i ed the L ower Pal at i nate, as i t bor e st r ategi c im por tan ce i n thei r cam pai gn agai n st the D u t ch , wh i ch had r ecen t been r esum ed af ter a twel ve- year t r uce. T h i s saw the en t r an ce of another f or ei gn non -Germ an power i n to the war , as Fr eder i ck was the stepson of Jam es I of Engl and . Jam es?s i nvo l vem en t was br i ef , and on l y f ocused agai n st the Span i sh , and m ai n l y on behal f of h i s stepson . T he nex t power to en ter the ever - expand i ng con f l i ct was D enm ar k , i n 1625. T he Dan i sh k i ng, Ch r i st i an I V, was al so the duke of H o l stei n , wh i ch m ade

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h im po l i t i cal p r esen ce i n nor ther n Germ any. L i ke Br andenbu r g and Saxony, D enm ar k was a Pr otestan t coun t r y. T he Dan i sh advan ce i n to Catho l i c hear t l ands m et w i th l i t t l e success, however , and when i t becam e appar en t that the ef f or t was f ai l i ng, Ch r i st i an was abandoned by Saxony, wh i ch d i d not v i ew Dan i sh dom i nat i on as any bet ter than Im per i al dom i nat i on . I n h i s of f en si ve agai n st D enm ar k , Gener al Wal l en stei n (sup r em e com m ander of the arm i es of Em per or Fer d i nand I I ) at tacked the por t of St r al sund , whose sh i p - bu i l d i ng f aci l i t i es wou l d hel p f aci l i tate an at tack on m ai n l and D enm ar k . Sweden en ter ed the war i n St r al sund?s def en ce, and caused Wal l er stei n to qu i ck l y m ake peace w i th D enm ar k i n 1629, desp i te m or e def eat s on the par t of the Dan i sh , as con cer n s wer e r ai sed over f u r ther Swed i sh i n ter ven t i on , as wel l as over st r et ched Aust r i an r esou r ces. a si gn i f i can t

r eal i sed , as Sweden f u l l y en ter ed the con f l i ct , par t l y ou t of a desi r e to ai d f el l ow Pr otestan t nat i on s agai n st Catho l i c opp r essi on that substan t i al l y i n cr eased af ter the Ed i ct of Rest i tu t i on , wh i ch dem anded that al l chu r ch p r oper t i es that had been sei zed by Pr otestan t f or ces be r etu r ned to Catho l i c hands. T h i s al i enated al l the Pr otestan t states wh i ch had so f ar t r i ed to m ai n tai n a posi t i on of neu t r al i t y (Saxony and Br andenbu r g). T he other r eason f or the f u l l - scal e Swed i sh i n ter ven t i on was the p r ospect of becom i ng the dom i nan t Bal t i c power , as m uch of Sweden?s i n com e was based of f t r ade tar i f f s. T he Swed i sh k i ng, Gustavus Ado l phus, used St r al sund as a l and i ng po i n t f or h i s arm y, wh i ch con si sted of 18,0 0 0 so l d i er s. H e was backed by Fr en ch f i nan ci ng, desp i te Fr an ce possessi ng an opposi te con f essi onal i den t i t y to Sweden . I t was, i n f act , Car d i nal Ri chel i eu who was r espon si b l e f or the f orm at i on of the coal i t i on Swed i sh coal i t i on , wh i ch

I n 1630 , Wal l en stei n?s f ear s wer e

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i n cl uded and Br andenbu r g. Gustavus Ado l phus won a ser i es of m ajor v i ctor i es agai n st Im per i al f or ces, wh i ch gr eat l y i nh i b i ted Catho l i c f or ces. H owever , af ter h i s death , and a m ajor def eat i n the Bat t l e of Nör d l i ngen , con t i nued Swed i sh par t i ci pat i on i n the war was under ser i ous doubt . T h i s l ed Fr an ce to i n ter vene d i r ect l y agai n st Im per i al f or ces i n 1635. W h i l st the Swed i sh i n ter ven t i on was som ewhat con f essi onal , the Fr en ch i n ter ven t i on was who l l y p r agm at i c. I f Im per i al f or ces won the war , then they wou l d be si gn i f i can t l y m or e power f u l , wh i ch wou l d l eave Fr an ce su r r ounded by two host i l e H apsbu r g power s, a posi t i on that wou l d su r el y l ead to the u l t im ate dem i se of Fr an ce. T he Fr en ch i n ter ven t i on caused Fer d i nand to sw i f t l y m ake peace w i th al l Germ an states? he w i thd r ew the Ed i ct . I t i s at th i s po i n t that the war ceased to be a Germ an ci v i l war , d r i ven by con f essi onal d i f f er en ces, and becam e a war between d i st i n ct Eu r opean states Saxony

abou t the estab l i shm en t of a bal an ce of power . T he con cl usi on of the con f l i ct w i th the Peace of Westphal i a i n 1648 r econ f i rm ed Pr otestan t r i gh t s, r ecogn i sed Cal v i n i sm as a r el i gi on , and add i t i onal l y guar an teed the r i gh t of r el i gi ous f r eedom to con f essi onal m i nor i t i es. T h i s peace ended con f essi onal con f l i ct th r oughou t the H o l y Rom an Em p i r e, m ak i ng i t the l ast con f essi onal war .

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T h e Econ om i cs of Fasci sm Rawdy Partridge, Fifths.

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W

hen

H i t l er

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decr easi ng to 30 2,0 0 0 by Januar y 1939. I t gave H i t l er a way to er ad i cate unem p l oym en t wh i l st p r epar i ng a m i l i tar y m ach i ne that cou l d gai n h im a cen t r al Eu r opean em p i r e. T he Weh rm ach t was bo l ster ed as a d i r ect r esu l t of Germ any ?s econom i c co l l apse i n the ear l y 1930 s. W hy was th i s si gn i f i can t f or the Second Wor l d War ? W i thou t the Weh rm ach t , wh i ch had i n cr eased i n si ze by 30 0 ,0 0 0 m en f r om 1933 to 1936, and w i thou t the L u f twaf f e, wh i ch had i n cr eased by 8,20 0 ai r cr af t between 1933 and 1939, Nazi aggr essi on wou l d have been im possi b l e. H i t l er wou l d not have had a weapon that wou l d have al l owed h im to th r eaten h i s opponen t s i n to subm i ssi on or appeasem en t . Germ an econom i c st r uggl es, wh i ch par t l y p r eci p i tated the st r engthen i ng of the Weh rm ach t , ther ef or e hel ped cause the ou tbr eak of war w i th H i t l er ?s i nvasi on of Po l and . I n a sen se, econom i cs began the con f l i ct .

appo i n ted chan cel l or

i n

Januar y econom i c catast r ophe i n Germ any was endem i c. 30% of the nat i on?s wor k f or ce was unem p l oyed , and the im pact of the Wal l St r eet Cr ash was pal pab l e. I n 1933, the Germ an econom y was wor th a total of 61 b i l l i on Rei chsm ar ks, com par ed to 71 b i l l i on i n 1928 (p r i or to the Cr ash ). At the star t of h i s l eader sh i p H i t l er , decl ar ed that the arm y, or Weh rm ach t , wou l d be key to h i s new econom i c m ach i ne. I t s pu r pose was to at tai n l eben sr aum (?l i v i ng space?), wh i ch wou l d al l ow the Germ an econom y to gai n vast m ater i al r esou r ces such as coal , o i l and steel . I ndeed , m i l i tar y spend i ng i n cr eased f r om 1% to 10% of the Germ an econom y i n the f i r st two year s of abso l u te Nazi con t r o l . T h i s expend i tu r e was key to al l ow i ng the Germ an econom y to r ecover . Unem p l oym en t stat i st i cs i l l ust r ate th i s? i n Januar y 1933, unem p l oym en t sat at 6 m i l l i on , 1933,

14

Japan had a sim i l ar stor y to that

15

of Germ any when i t i nvaded M an chu r i a and Wester n co l on i es i n the Far East f r om 1933 to 1942. Japan?s l ack of natu r al r esou r ces was especi al l y v i tal ; the Japanese r egar ded expan si on i sm as a way of acqu i r i ng m ater i al s such as o i l , r ubber and l um ber . Tokyo saw the vast o i l r eser ves of the D u t ch East I nd i es as a way to gai n r esou r ces, al ongsi de the l ands of the Ph i l i pp i nes, Br i t i sh Bu rm a and Fr en ch I ndoch i na. Japan?s weak econom i cs thus caused m ass death and dest r uct i on th r oughou t the East i n i t s st r uggl e to sustai n i t sel f . T he Rape of Nan k i ng i s one stor y am ongst m any of i n st i tu t i onal i zed Japanese br u tal i t y i n thei r quest i on to sei ze l and f or econom i c r eason s, to accoun t f or thei r l ack of r esou r ces. M or eover , econom i cs d r ew Japan i n to con f l i ct w i th the Un i ted States. Upon the r ecogn i t i on of Japanese i n ten t i on s i n Ch i na i n l ate 1941, Fr an k l i n Roosevel t or der ed a b l ockade of Japan to st r angl e i t f u r ther of natu r al

r esou r ces. two op t i on s? d r own i n a l ack of r esou r ces or t r y and f i gh t i t s way ou t of the Am er i can b l ockade. I t r egar ded the Am er i can s as a r ace of im poten t p i gs, and so l aun ched i t s at tack on Pear l H ar bor , wh i ch t r u l y i n i t i ated the Paci f i c con f l i ct . T he m ater i al b l ockade of Japan f or ced Tokyo?s hand econom i cal l y, escal at i ng the con f l i ct . I n the Far East as i n Eu r ope, then , the stor y of the Second Wor l d War i s ver y m uch one of econom i cs. I n l ate 1941, sen i or Germ an of f i ci al s r ecogn i sed that thei r posi t i on was not econom i cal l y tenab l e. I n Ber l i n on 28 Novem ber 1941, i ndust r i al i st s l ed by sen i or Nazi Fr i t z Tod t r eached the con cl usi on that the war was econom i cal l y and m i l i tar i l y unw i nnab l e. T hey r eached th i s con cl usi on on the gr ounds that Russi a r em ai ned undef eated at the end of 1941. T he Weh rm ach t had l ost m om en tum , and the Russi an i ndust r i al beast had awoken . Wal ter Roh l and , sen i or i n tan k p r oduct i on , to l d H i t l er Japan had

16

that , on ce the Un i ted States becam e p r oper l y i nvo l ved , Germ any ?s econom y wou l d be dwar f ed by the com b i nat i on of Al l i ed econom i es. Germ any, because of econom i cs, cou l d not w i n . I n D ecem ber 1941, a p l an cal l ed the ?Requ i r em en t s f or Vi ctor y,? was d r af ted by the Germ an s. T h i s p l an wou l d take $150 b i l l i on to com p l ete successf u l l y. Germ an arm s expend i tu r e never r eached th i s m agn i tude th r oughou t the en t i r e si x- year st r uggl e, dem on st r at i ng the Rei ch?s econom i c weakness. Germ any ?s econom i c weakness and i nab i l i t y to f i gh t a p r ot r acted war was dem on st r ated as ear l y as 1939. By 1939, Germ any had am assed 40 b i l l i on Rei chsm ar ks i n debt , and d i sr egar d f or r esou r ces had becom e com m onp l ace. T he Weh rm ach t?s i n st i tu t i onal i sed appet i te f or dest r uct i on , especi al l y i n the East , wou l d r etu r n to en cum ber the Germ an econom y. I t cou l d not d r aw the r esou r ces that i t shou l d have been ab l e to f r om i t s vast

Eu r opean em p i r e because of such dest r uct i on . Nazi con tem p t f or hum an l i f e was begi nn i ng the T h i r d Rei ch?s co l l apse even du r i ng i t s per i ods of success. H i t l er an t i ci pated a l ong st r uggl e that wou l d i nev i tab l y begi n a war between the Sov i et Un i on and West i n the year s to com e. H e bel i eved thei r i deo l ogi cal d i f f er en ces wou l d cause the ?Gr and Al l i an ce,? to br eak down , and that Germ any cou l d be saved i f she p l ayed her r o l e p r oper l y i n en su r i ng the war wen t as l ong as possi b l e. H e was cor r ect , bu t the Co l d War wou l d com e f ar too l ate to save the T h i r d Rei ch . Japan , too, wou l d com e to f i nd i t sel f econom i cal l y ecl i psed by the Un i ted States. Fr om 1941 to 1945, the Un i ted States p r oduced 30 0 ,0 0 0 m i l i tar y and speci al - pu r pose ai r cr af t , 72,10 0 naval sh i ps, 4,90 0 m er chan t sh i ps, and 87,0 0 0 tan ks. Japan d i d not have any th i ng app r oach i ng the r esou r ces to m at ch th i s, desp i te i t s r am page acr oss Easter n Asi a i n ear l y 1942. 17

16

I t s m i l i tar y was m ade to appear alm ost d i v i ne i n the f ace of i n com peten t Br i t i sh , Fr en ch and Am er i can def en se i n 1942, yet i t possessed no r eal arm or ed f or ces. O n ce a m or e p r ot r acted con f l i ct began , i t was qu i ck l y r eal i sed that Japan d i d not have a sustai nab l e supp l y of arm s p r oduct i on , and af ter the Bat t l es of the Cor al Sea and M i dway, i t f ound i t sel f w i th a l acer ated navy, too. T he Un i ted States, by con t r ast , cou l d easi l y r epai r and m anu f actu r e vessel s, and so always had f or ces to har r y the i n cr easi ngl y weak Japanese. So l ar ge was the U.S. naval advan tage that i t has been debated whether the Am er i can s? ?I sl and H opp i ng,? ven tu r es wer e actual l y needed to def eat the Japanese (see M ax H ast i ngs, Al l H el l L et L oose). T h i s i s because the U.S. was al r eady st r angl i ng the Japanese econom y. I n O ctober 1944 al one, 322,265 ton s of Japanese sh i pp i ng was sun k . Total am oun t s r ose to 6 m i l l i on ton s of dest r oyed sh i pp i ng over the war ?s cou r se. T he U.S., then , cou l d have star ved Japan i n to

su r r ender , yet deci ded not to? causi ng m any unnecessar y deaths i n the U.S. and Japanese arm i es al i ke. T he U.S., of cou r se, wou l d go on to sub jugate Japan w i th atom i c weapon s, yet i t s v i ctor y u l t im atel y depended on econom i cs. H ad they l acked such vast i ndust r i al r eser ves, the Am er i can s wou l d have been unab l e to def eat Japan w i th the easy they even tual l y d i d . Japan ther ef or e l ost the Second Wor l d War on econom i c gr ounds. Par adox i cal l y, i t was econom i cs that caused the cr eat i on of thei r em p i r es. Yet i t was i t s i n st i tu t i onal econom i c weakness that caused the def eat of f asci sm i n 1945. Both Germ any and

18

T he T r eat y of Ver sai l l es and i t s Im pact on Germ any.

18

19 Edward Richardson, Fifths

T

he T r eat y of Ver sai l l es, si gned i n 1919, was the peace t r eat y w i th Germ any wh i ch f o l l owed

r educt i on of Germ any ?s arm y and navy, as wel l as the abo l i t i on of i t s ai r f or ce. T he si gn i f i can ce of the T r eat y to Germ any i n the per i od 1919- 1923 can be assessed by l ook i ng at whether the T r eat y weakened and i so l ated Germ any du r i ng th i s per i od and whether the T r eat y caused or added to si gn i f i can t po l i t i cal and econom i c p r ob l em s i n Germ any. T h i s w i l l show that the T r eat y was si gn i f i can t because i t d i d i so l ate Germ any f or a t im e, bu t that i t d i d not r eal l y weaken Germ any, and that the T r eat y m ade wor se, bu t d i d not cause, cer tai n ex i st i ng po l i t i cal and econom i c p r ob l em s i n Germ any. T he p r ov i si on s i n the T r eat y that Germ any be excl uded f r om the L eague of Nat i on s, l ose ter r i tor i es and co l on i es and d i sarm d i d l eave Germ any i so l ated , at l east un t i l 1922, when i t si gned the T r eat y of Rapal l o w i th Russi a. T hey d i d not r eal l y weaken Germ any, however . Asi de f r om Russi a, i t r em ai ned the coun t r y i n Eu r ope w i th the b i ggest popu l at i on . Geogr aph i cal l y, i t was p r obab l y

the Fi r st Wor l d War . I t set ou t the term s of the peace w i th Germ any. T he Germ an pub l i c had hoped f or a set t l em en t based on US Pr esi den t Wood r ow W i l son?s Fou r teen Po i n t s, bu t they wer e ou t r aged when the term s wer e pub l i shed . T he term s i n cl uded : the estab l i shm en t of the L eague of Nat i on s, f r om wh i ch Germ any was excl uded ; a war gu i l t cl ause, m ak i ng i t cl ear that Germ any was gu i l t y of star t i ng the war ; a r equ i r em en t that Germ any pay r epar at i on s f or the dam age caused by the war (wh i ch i n 1921 wer e set at £6.6 b i l l i on , bu t wh i ch wer e l ater r educed ); ter r i tor i al ad justm en t s wh i ch r esu l ted i n Germ any l osi ng si gn i f i can t ter r i tor i es al ong both i t s easter n and wester n bor der s am oun t i ng to 13% of i t s l and and 12% of i t s popu l at i on ; the l oss of Germ any ?s co l on i es to the L eague of Nat i on s; a p r oh i b i t i on on Germ any un i t i ng w i th Aust r i a; and the

20

l ef t st r onger than bef or e the war because i t was now su r r ounded on i t s easter n bor der by a ser i es of sm al l , weak states. T he th r eat f r om Russi a was r em oved because of the Russi an Revo l u t i on . Al though Germ any l ost the coal of the Saar and the i r on or e of Al sace- L or r ai ne, i t was ?ab l e, i n a r em ar kab l y shor t t im e, to dom i nate the t r ade of the cen t r al and easter n Eu r opean states? (Stei ner ).1 Germ an i ndust r y qu i ck l y r ev i ved , too. T he r educt i on of the Germ an arm y st i l l l ef t i t at 10 0 ,0 0 0 ? l ar ger than Germ any ?s nei ghbou r s to the east and l ar ge enough to hand l e t r oub l e i n Germ any? and had the benef i t that i t wou l d hel p the econom y to gr ow by r educi ng gover nm en t spend i ng on the m i l i tar y. O ne cou l d ar gue, as d i d the econom i st Key nes, that the T r eat y was a ?Car thagi n i an peace,?2 r educi ng Germ any to a power of the second r an k and perm anen t l y p r even t i ng i t f r om r etu r n i ng to gr eat - power status. T he ar r angem en t s f or the Saar and Al sace- L or r ai ne wer e an

i l l ust r at i on? tak i ng away f r om Germ any the m ean s of ever wagi ng war . U l t im atel y, however , Germ any was not r eal l y weakened because i t was ab l e to r ecover , and i t en joyed econom i c p r osper i t y du r i ng the 1920 s. T he l oss of ter r i tor i es and co l on i es m i gh t have been i n tended to weaken Germ any, bu t i t does not seem to have done th i s. T he basi c st r ength of the Germ an econom y was not bad l y weakened . T he r eal si gn i f i can ce of the l oss of ter r i tor i es was i n the w i sh f or ?r evenge? wh i ch i t cr eated i n f ar - r i gh t po l i t i ci an s, wh i ch becam e im por tan t i n the 1930 s. A si gn i f i can t po l i t i cal p r ob l em f aci ng Germ any was that i t had a ser i es of weak , coal i t i on gover nm en t s, none of wh i ch l asted l ong. For exam p l e, the gover nm en t f orm ed f o l l ow i ng the f i r st el ect i on i n 1919 between the SPD , Z en t r um and the DDP on l y l asted a f ew m on ths and ther e wer e th r ee gover nm en t s between Febr uar y 1919 and June 1920 . H en i g says that ?hen cef or th Germ any wou l d be r u l ed by a

20

21

ser i es coal i t i on gover nm en t s, destab i l i sed by ever y cr i si s and unab l e to of f er st r ong l eader sh i p .?3 T he T r eat y cer tai n l y added to th i s destab i l i sat i on by causi ng a num ber of these cr i ses. O ne of these cr i ses was i n m i d - 1919, when Chan cel l or Schei dem ann r esi gned af ter the r eject i on of the T r eat y by the Germ an cab i net and Pr esi den t Eber t of f er ed to r esi gn . Another was i n 1920 w i th the at tem p ted pu t sch by Wo l f gang Kapp , caused by an at tem p t to r educe the arm y as r equ i r ed by the T r eat y. Chan cel l or Bauer and D ef en ce M i n i ster Noske both r esi gned as a r esu l t . Yet another exam p l e occu r r ed w i th the i nvasi on of the Ruh r i n 1923 by Fr en ch and Bel gi an t r oops af ter Germ any ?s f ai l u r e to pay the r epar at i on s r equ i r ed by the T r eat y. T hese even t s al l destab i l i sed weak gover nm en t s. T he T r eat y was not al one i n add i ng to the destab i l i sat i on of Germ an gover nm en t s. T he f ar - l ef t and f ar - r i gh t al so added to i t by act i ng of weak

ou t si de the Germ an con si tu t i on . T he Spar taci st up r i si ng of 1919 i s an exam p l e of the f ar - l ef t do i ng th i s, as was the Bavar i an up r i si ng of 1919. T he f ar - r i gh t d i d the sam e w i th the Kapp Pu t sch and the ?W h i te Ter r or ? wh i ch f o l l owed . T he f orm at i on of p r i vate arm i es by both the f ar - l ef t and the f ar - r i gh t ar e other exam p l es. O ne cou l d ar gue that the T r eat y underm i ned the l egi t im acy of the Weim ar Repub l i c. Ever yone i n Germ any was angr y at the term s of the T r eat y and the way i n wh i ch i t was im posed upon Germ any? a d i k tat , as they saw i t . Cr ai g tal ks abou t Germ an s bei ng ?aghast ,?4 wh i l st Key nes r ef er r ed to i t as bei ng a ?Car thagi n i an peace.?T h i s anger at the term s of the T r eat y sp r ead to anger at those who negot i ated and agr eed to the Arm i st i ce, cal l i ng them the ?Novem ber Cr im i nal s.? Because these peop l e wer e al so beh i nd the f orm at i on of the Weim ar Repub l i c, the anger and unw i l l i ngness of the peop l e to accep t the T r eat y becam e an

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unw i l l i ngness to accep t the Weim er Repub l i c. T her ef or e because the T r eat y was un just , i t d i d not have to be com p l i ed w i th , and nei ther d i d the Weim ar Repub l i c because i t was al so ?i n f ected .? T he T r eat y has been cal l ed the i n i t i al st r i ke agai n st the Weim ar Repub l i c f r om wh i ch i t wou l d never en t i r el y r ecover because i t caused the weakness of successi ve Germ an gover nm en t s. U l t im atel y, the T r eat y added to the destab i l i sat i on of a ser i es of Germ an gover nm en t s bu t d i d not cause the weakness of those gover nm en t s. T hat weakness was caused by a num ber of i ssues wh i ch wer e noth i ng to do w i th the T r eat y. Fi r st , the con st i tu t i on of the Weim ar Repub l i c had adop ted a system of p r opor t i onal r ep r esen tat i on , m ak i ng i t l i kel y that a w i de r ange of po l i t i cal par t i es wou l d w i n seat s i n any el ect i on (n i ne par t i es won seat s i n the f i r st el ect i on i n 1919). T h i s m ean t that usual l y a gover nm en t cou l d on l y be f orm ed th r ough a coal i t i on of sever al par t i es, and coal i t i on s of ten f ai l ed . Second l y,

the of ten r ep r esen ted par t i cu l ar cl asses, r el i gi ous per suasi on s or r egi on s and th i s m ade i t m or e d i f f i cu l t f or them to wor k together . T h i r d l y, the dem ocr at i c f r am ewor k of the Weim ar Repub l i c was new and the po l i t i cal par t i es i n i t i al l y f ound i t har d to under stand i t af ter the r u l e of the Kai ser . As H en i g says, ?the Weim ar po l i t i cal system was . . . gr avel y hand i capped f r om the ou t set by the r ange and dep th of soci al and econom i c d i v i si on s wh i ch ex i sted i n Germ any.?5 T he ar gum en t that the T r eat y d i d cause that weakness was l ar gel y i nven ted by r i gh t -w i ng ex t r em i st s who wan ted to just i f y act i ng ou t si de the con st i tu t i on of the Weim ar Repub l i c because they though t they wou l d never get i n to gover nm en t i n l egal ways. T he r equ i r em en t i n the T r eat y that Germ any pay r epar at i on s was not the i n i t i al cause of i n f l at i on i n Germ any i n the per i od 1919- 1923. I t d i d add to that i n f l at i on , bu t on l y because of the po l i ci es of Germ an po l i t i cal par t i es

22

23

gover nm en t s as they pai d the r epar at i on s. Repar at i on s d i d not cause i n f l at i on because i n f l at i on had al r eady begun i n Germ any wel l bef or e the f i r st paym en t of r epar at i on s was due. I t had begun because Germ any had ended the war w i th a debt of £8,934 m i l l i on . T he Germ an gover nm en t p r i n ted m or e ban knotes to star t r epay i ng th i s debt , and th i s star ted i n f l at i on . T hey d i d th i s because po l i t i cal l y i t was too d i f f i cu l t to pay i t by r ai si ng m oney f r om taxat i on or by cu t t i ng gover nm en t spend i ng. I n 1919, Er zber ger d i d i n t r oduce taxat i on on p r of i t s and i nher i ted weal th , bu t al though f u r ther tax r ef orm was needed to r ai se m or e m oney, none occu r r ed because gover nm en t s though t i t wou l d be too unpopu l ar and they wer e too weak . T hen i n 1923 when Fr en ch and Bel gi an t r oops i nvaded the Ruh r because the Germ an gover nm en t had m i ssed an i n stalm en t of r epar at i on s, the gover nm en t adop ted a po l i cy of passi ve r esi stan ce and i n st r ucted

wor ker s to st r i ke bu t pai d thei r wages by p r i n t i ng m or e ban knotes. H y per i n f l at i on then took ho l d . T he r epar at i on paym en t s undoubted l y d i d add to the hy per i n f l at i on , bu t they wer e not the or i gi nal cause. An al ter nat i ve ar gum en t i s that the r epar at i on s wer e of such an i n cr ed i b l e and r i d i cu l ous si ze that they wer e the cause of hy per i n f l at i on . U l t im atel y, however , the r epar at i on s shou l d have been m anageab l e. Germ an gover nm en t s b l am ed the r epar at i on s f or hy per i n f l at i on because th i s was easi er than adm i t t i ng that thei r own po l i ci es wer e to b l am e. Accor d i ng to M ar gar et M acM i l l an , Germ any pai d on l y £1.1 m i l l i on i n the who l e per i od un t i l 1932. She says that ?th i s i s p r obab l y sl i gh t l y l ess than what Fr an ce, w i th a m uch sm al l er econom y, pai d Germ any af ter the Fr an co-Pr ussi an War of 1870 - 71.? I n add i t i on , because hy per i n f l at i on caused the val ue of the Germ an cu r r en cy to f al l , ther e i s a suggest i on that Germ an gover nm en t s del i ber atel y

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en cou r aged hy per i n f l at i on . T hey hoped that r epar at i on paym en t s wou l d be m ade i n the deval ued Germ an cu r r en cy. T he T r eat y was si gn i f i can t to Germ any i n the per i od 1919- 23. I t s si gn i f i can ce was that i t i so l ated Germ any f or a wh i l e, i t added to the destab i l i sat i on of a ser i es of weak Germ an gover nm en t s and i t m ade wor se the hy per i n f l at i on wh i ch had al r eady taken ho l d i n Germ any. T he Germ an pub l i c and som e com m en tator s, both at the t im e and m or e r ecen t l y, wer e appal l ed by i t s term s. T hey ar gued that i t was desi gned to dest r oy Germ any and i t s econom y, bu t i t d i d not do that . Germ any was po l i t i cal l y i so l ated f or a t im e, bu t i t r em ai ned st r ong and i t s econom y qu i ck l y r ecover ed . I t cer tai n l y had m ajor p r ob l em s du r i ng the per i od 1919- 23 w i th weak gover nm en t s and hy per i n f l at i on , bu t the T r eat y d i d not cause these. I t destab i l i sed al r eady weak gover nm en t s, as d i d l ef t -w i ng and r i gh t -w i ng ex t r em i st s, and i t added to hy per i n f l at i on caused

by Germ an gover nm en t po l i cy. Beyond that , i t was r eal l y on l y an i r r i tan t to the Germ an peop l e.

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25

T h e Con ser vat i sm of th e N ew D eal Alex T illotson, Lower Sixth

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T

o Ber n stei n , the New D eal ?was f undam en tal l y con ser vat i ve and con t i nued w i th the

p r ov i ded f or the cr eat i on of i ndust r i al codes to decr ease com pet i t i on f or busi ness, a cl ear l y p r o- busi ness aim , and the codes wer e d r af ted by the l ead i ng f i rm s of the i ndust r i es them sel ves, m ean i ng they wer e co- op ted by busi ness. T h i s m ean t that the codes f avou r ed econom i c con ci l i at i on and h i gher p r i ces, wh i ch wer e not necessar i l y passed down to the wor ker s i n the f orm of h i gher wages. H owever , th i s ar gum en t f ai l s to take i n to accoun t the l im i t s to the f eder al gover nm en t?s capaci t y i n 1935. As Badger ar gues, ther e sim p l y was not the ?state capaci t y ?to d r af t the 50 0 codes by Sep tem ber 1934, as the f eder al gover nm en t l acked both exper t i se and staf f . M or eover , Sect i on 7(a) of the N I RA al l owed f or the r ecogn i t i on of l abou r un i on s, con si der ed host i l e to busi ness i n ter est . M or eover , the Wagner Act of 1935 was osten si b l y l egi sl at i on that th r eatened busi ness i n ter est s, wh i l st the N L RA l acked a si ngl e busi ness r ep r esen tat i ve. H owever , i t has been ar gued that the

1920 s.?I t cou l d be ar gued that the New D eal was con ser vat i ve due to i t s essen t i al r el i an ce on busi ness and p r i vate en ter p r i se to ach i eve econom i c r ecover y, and thus d i d not br eak w i th the status quo of the gover nm en t of the 1920 s. M or eover , ther e wer e cl ear l im i tat i on s to the New D eal ?s scope, as i t f ai l ed to p r ov i de st r uctu r al r ef orm and r em ai ned w i th i n the con st i tu t i onal and f i nan ci al norm s of the 1920 s. H owever , these ar gum en t s f ai l to accoun t f or the r evo l u t i on the New D eal p r ov i ded i n the f orm of econom i c secu r i t y and do not acknow l edge the con tex tual l im i tat i on s the New D eal f aced . T her e i s scope to ar gue that the New D eal was f undam en tal l y con ser vat i ve i n i t s deal i ngs w i th busi ness. As Con k i n ar gues, i t was r el i an t on p r i vate en ter p r i se to p r om p t econom i c r ecover y and was essen t i al l y p r o- busi ness. T he Nat i onal I ndust r i al Recover y Act

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co l l ect i ve bar gai n i ng r ecogn i t i on of the Act was a con ser vat i ve at tem p t to hal t l abou r d i spu tes and i n cr ease p r oduct i v i t y, as the cr eat i on of the N L RB as a m ed i ator bal an ced econom i c power between l abou r and busi ness, en cou r agi ng the CIO st r i kes of 1936 and 1937. I n these r espect s, then , the New D eal was con tem por ar i l y v i ewed as host i l e to busi ness and on l y r el i ed on busi ness when l ack i ng state capaci t y. Ber n stei n ar gues that the New D eal was con ser vat i ve i n what i t d i d not do: i t s f ai l u r es to r est r uctu r e the econom y and em p l oy Key nesi an m ethods. I t i s t r ue that the CWA and FERA wer e l im i ted by a bel i ef i n r el i ef over st im u l us, the CWA bei ng cl osed down i n 1934 to bal an ce the budget and the FERA p r ov i d i ng $25 ou t of a r equ i r ed $10 0 f or subsi sten ce. Add i t i onal l y, the r egr essi ve tax im posed by Soci al Secu r i t y Act l ed to the so- cal l ed ?Roosevel t r ecessi on?i n 1937, a r esu l t of t i gh t

f i scal po l i cy. Ber n stei n?s m ai n ar gum en t i s that FDR f ai l ed to nat i onal i se the ban ks i n 1933, when cond i t i on s wou l d have al l owed . H owever , i n 1933, the New D eal needed to r estor e con f i den ce to ease the l i qu i dat i on s, and on l y an act i on to bo l ster the status quo cou l d ach i eve th i s. Add i t i onal l y, the gover nm en t l acked the i n st i tu t i onal capaci t y to do th i s, and thus con ser vat i sm her e was not a r esu l t of f ai l ed po l i cy, bu t of con tex tual l im i tat i on s and the need f or con f i den ce. M or eover , the begi nn i ngs of Key nesi an i sm cou l d be seen i n the W PA, wh i ch h i r ed one f i f th of the nat i on?s wor k f or ce f or st im u l at i ng i n f r ast r uctu r e p r o ject s. I n the f i nal anal ysi s, then , ther e was l i t t l e congr essi onal suppor t f or h i gh r el i ef spend i ng, and m uch p r essu r e f or a bal an ced budget . I t i s ther ef or e val i d to say that Ber n stei n?s accusat i on of con ser vat i sm i s i nval i d ; l im i t s to spend i ng wer e l ar gel y a r esu l t of con tex t , not po l i cy.

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T he best ev i den ce of the l i ber al i sm of New D eal l i es i n i t s p r ov i si on of econom i c secu r i t y. As Kennedy ar gues, the New D eal successf u l l y r ef orm ed Am er i can cap i tal i sm , cr eat i ng an unp r eceden ted saf et y net . T he Soci al Secu r i t y Act p r ov i ded a f eder al o l d age pen si on f or the f i r st t im e, p r otect i ng those who cou l d not wor k , wh i l st unem p l oym en t i n su r an ce p r otected the popu l at i on f r om the changi ng busi ness cycl e. I t cou l d be ar gued that as o l d - age pen si on s wer e f unded by a r egr essi on f orm of taxat i on , i t was i n keep i ng w i th the standar ds of the 1920 s r el i ef po l i cy, and con ser vat i ve. H owever , th i s tax was desi gned to st r engthen Soci al Secu r i t y po l i t i cal l y by cr eat i ng a sen se of en t i t l em en t to o l d - age pen si on s am ongst the el ector ate. I t has f u r ther been ar gued that unem p l oym en t i n su r an ce was i n su f f i ci en t and var i ab l e, p r ov i d i ng $61 i n M assachuset t s and on l y $8 i n Ar kan sas due to the f undam en tal f eder al - state

con st i tu t i onal con ser vat i sm of the New D eal and FDR. H owever , th i s l im i tat i on was a com p r om i se m ade due to host i l i t y to f eder al i n ter ven t i on , par t i cu l ar l y am ongst Sou ther n D em ocr at s. T hus the New D eal was f or ced to com p r om i se to p r otect i t s ver y ex i sten ce f r om congr essi onal host i l i t y. I n con cl usi on , the New D eal was not f undam en tal l y con ser vat i ve, w i th i t s l i ber al i sm p r oven i n how ?the basi s f or the m oder n Am er i can wel f ar e state was l ai d? (Kennedy ). T he ar gum en t that i t was con ser vat i ve due to busi ness i n ter est s bei ng p r i or i t i sed i s i nval i d due to the New D eal ?s r ebal an ci ng of l abou r and busi ness r el at i on s. Any con ser vat i ve r esu l t s of the New D eal wer e not a r esu l t of po l i cy, bu t of po l i t i cal and con st i tu t i onal l im i tat i on s.

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?Sh i va Natar aja? T he Sym bo l i sm of the Dan ci ng Neel Gokal, Lower Sixth

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f m ost awe- i n sp i r i ng H i ndu sym bo l s, the ?Sh i va al l the

f i gu r e. I n h i s upper r i gh t hand , he ho l ds a dum ar u , a sm al l d r um , and i n h i s upper l ef t hand , a f l am e. T he ener gy of the dan ce m akes h i s hai r f l y to the si des, to the ends of the un i ver se. Cen t r al to the m an i f estat i on of Sh i va as Natar aja i s i ndeed dan ce. Rhy thm , heat , ener gy and m ovem en t ar e what def i ne Sh i va?s eter nal dan ce. I n th i s f i gu r e he i s bel i eved to be engagi ng i n a par t i cu l ar dan ce cal l ed Ananda Tandava, t y p i cal l y t r an sl ated as ?Dan ce of Bl i ss.? H owever , th i s t r an sl at i on appear s to be m i sl ead i ng when con si der i ng the m ean i ng of each wor d . I n San sk r i t , ananda m ean s ?b l i ss? and tandava m ean s ?f i er ce dan ce.? T her ef or e, Ananda Tandava r ather appear s to suggest a par adox . T h i s becom es appar en t when v i ew i ng the im age as a r ep r esen tat i on of the dual i t y of Sh i va?s natu r e. O n the one hand , Sh i va dan ces f i er cel y i n a r i ng of f i r e, yet he appear s to be per f ect l y bal an ced and st i l l on h i s one l eg, w i th h i s f ace bear i ng a

Natar aja? (?L or d of the Dan ce?) f i gu r e i s am ong the m ost cap t i vat i ng. W i th i n th i s sym bo l , we f i nd a power f u l i l l ust r at i on of H i ndu bel i ef s, subsequen t l y enab l i ng the f i gu r e to becom e a sou r ce of w i desp r ead f asci nat i on am ongst al l cu l tu r es. Sim u l taneousl y com b i n i ng Sh i va?s r o l e as both cr eator and dest r oyer , ever y detai l of the im age i s sym bo l i c. Al though appear i ng i n scu l p tu r e as ear l y as the f i f th - cen tu r y CE, the d i st i n ct i ve char acter i st i cs of the Sh i va Natar aja f i gu r e evo l ved under the r u l e of the Cho l a dy nast y (880 - 1270CE) to i t s m ost r ecogn i sab l e f orm today. T he br on ze statue dep i ct s Sh i va i n h i s m an i f estat i on as the f ou r - arm ed L or d of the Cosm i c Dan ce, po i sed i n h i s dan ce stan ce of Natar aja. Sh i va dan ces i n a r i ng of f i r e, w i th h i s r i gh t l eg r ai sed gen t l y cr ossi ng h i s body, and h i s l ef t f oot p l aced on a dwar f - l i ke

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